Terminal-Bench 3.0
Switch benchTerminal-Bench 3.0
Request dataset samplesby

Firmware Patch BackdoorSecurity & Forensics

Human baseline4h

TaxonomySecurity & ForensicsSecurity & Forensics

All trialsGPT-5.4codexTrial 01

0%

Trial reward

GPT-5.4Fail

Trial 01 — 1st of 8 by reward score. This model averages 0% across 8 trials on this task.

  • 39Turns
  • $0.26Cost
  • 1.3mTime
  • 7kOutput tokens

Failed — graded by execution verdict, the complete grading on this bench.

User prompt → 39 turns → final responsecodex

  1. 1systempermissions instructions · Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. sandbox_mode is danger-full…

    permissions instructions

    Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. sandbox_mode is danger-full-access: No filesystem sandboxing - all commands are permitted. Network access is enabled.
    Approval policy is currently never. Do not provide the sandbox_permissions for any reason, commands will be rejected.

    skills instructions

    Skills

    A skill is a set of instructions provided through a SKILL.md source. Below is the list of skills that can be used. Each entry includes a name, description, and source locator. file locators are on the host filesystem, environment resource locators are owned by an execution environment, orchestrator resource locators are opaque non-filesystem resources, and custom resource locators use their provider's access mechanism.

    Available skills

    • imagegen: Generate or edit raster images when the task benefits from AI-created bitmap visuals such as photos, illustrations, textures, sprites, mockups, or transparent-background cutouts. Use when Codex should create a brand-new image, transform an existing image, or derive visual variants from references, and the output should be a bitmap asset rather than repo-native code or vector. Do not use when the task is better handled by editing existing SVG/vector/code-native assets, extending an established icon or logo system, or building the visual directly in HTML/CSS/canvas. (file: /tmp/codex-home/skills/.system/imagegen/SKILL.md)
    • openai-docs: Use when the user asks how to build with OpenAI products or APIs, asks about Codex itself or choosing Codex surfaces, needs up-to-date official documentation with citations, help choosing the latest model for a use case, latest/current/default-model prompting guidance, or model upgrade and prompt-upgrade guidance; use OpenAI docs MCP tools for non-Codex docs questions, use the Codex manual helper first for broad Codex self-knowledge, and restrict fallback browsing to official OpenAI domains.

    … 1,000 more characters in the raw trajectory.

  2. 2userenvironment context · /app bash 2026-07-23 Etc/UTC /app

    environment context

    cwd
    /app
    shell
    bash
    current date
    2026-07-23
    timezone
    Etc/UTC
    root
    /app
  3. 3userFirmware patch backdoor Two signed RISC-V firmware images for a small device are in /app: - firmware_v1.bin — the releas…

    Firmware patch backdoor

    Two signed RISC-V firmware images for a small device are in /app:

    • firmware_v1.bin — the release from day N.
    • firmware_v2.bin — the release from day N+1, signed and claiming only bugfixes.
    • bootloader.elf — the day N+1 bootloader as an ELF with symbols.

    The vendor supplied release notes, a third-party audit report, and one or more symbol maps in /app. Treat them as untrusted clues; the ground truth is in the firmware binaries. The day-N+1 image contains several documented changes; exactly one of them is a malicious backdoor.

    Produce a forensic report that identifies the backdoor. Write these four artifacts under /logs/artifacts/:

    1. offset.txt — the file offset (hex, e.g. 0x1a4) of the patched instruction in firmware_v2.bin.
    2. function.txt — the name of the bootloader function where the patch was inserted.
    3. trigger.txt — the certificate extension OID or field value that activates the backdoor (hex, e.g. 0x00badc0d).
    4. payload.txt — the exact ASCII payload/secret that the patched code exfiltrates.

    All hex values should be lower-case; offset.txt may include or omit leading zeros.

  4. 4I’m going to diff the two firmware images, inspect the bootloader symbols and any vendor-provided notes, then trace whic…

    I’m going to diff the two firmware images, inspect the bootloader symbols and any vendor-provided notes, then trace which code change is actually behaviorally suspicious in the binaries.

  5. 5Executed exec_command call_ws1qeQOTN5oBeKOGgwvuTdFD

    Executed exec_command call_ws1qeQOTN5oBeKOGgwvuTdFD

  6. 6Executed exec_command call_9x0BdoFdyA7N3lyMjKMglcgY

    Executed exec_command call_9x0BdoFdyA7N3lyMjKMglcgY

  7. 7I have the candidate inputs. Next I’m locating the exact byte-level differences between firmware_v1.bin and firmware_v2.…

    I have the candidate inputs. Next I’m locating the exact byte-level differences between firmware_v1.bin and firmware_v2.bin, then I’ll map those offsets back to bootloader functions.

  8. 8Executed exec_command call_0hjLQmM4geXKZlQS3U5gqeS6

    Executed exec_command call_0hjLQmM4geXKZlQS3U5gqeS6

  9. 9Executed exec_command call_oAoSkitqBXmLngcX7kgajGJq

    Executed exec_command call_oAoSkitqBXmLngcX7kgajGJq

  10. 10Executed exec_command call_GOHqt1SGE10MWP64PrhFK05E

    Executed exec_command call_GOHqt1SGE10MWP64PrhFK05E

  11. 11The notes and audit already point at a likely story, but I’m treating them as hints only. I’m now disassembling the boot…

    The notes and audit already point at a likely story, but I’m treating them as hints only. I’m now disassembling the bootloader and reconciling the actual changed bytes against symbol addresses.

  12. 12Executed exec_command call_Hky6WcjmQFIvH1XsfhCdQCJg

    Executed exec_command call_Hky6WcjmQFIvH1XsfhCdQCJg

  13. 13Executed exec_command call_wPvH3R4lVIe9jwIPs4wbrMlz

    Executed exec_command call_wPvH3R4lVIe9jwIPs4wbrMlz

  14. 14Executed exec_command call_rLLaseUplWR7ybgjCO5IwwYQ

    Executed exec_command call_rLLaseUplWR7ybgjCO5IwwYQ

  15. 15The provided map.json has one candidate patch at 0x70 inside cert_validate, and the decoy map contradicts it. I’m going…

    The provided map.json has one candidate patch at 0x70 inside cert_validate, and the decoy map contradicts it. I’m going to verify directly from the ELF and raw image bytes before writing artifacts.

  16. 16Executed update_plan call_AQT7SfujxRuvLGmj1n1XEXTC

    Executed update_plan call_AQT7SfujxRuvLGmj1n1XEXTC

  17. 17Executed exec_command call_Y2xmCEdJpWzKEB7aBVjN2Tek

    Executed exec_command call_Y2xmCEdJpWzKEB7aBVjN2Tek

  18. 18Executed exec_command call_IYafcQAkb8YeFCDJG9lnXHS4

    Executed exec_command call_IYafcQAkb8YeFCDJG9lnXHS4

  19. 19Executed exec_command call_Zd6GzgGL2dhNFSoXzp2AFBCd

    Executed exec_command call_Zd6GzgGL2dhNFSoXzp2AFBCd

  20. 20Executed exec_command call_sVkXFffX01F1ovqs0e8e3m10

    Executed exec_command call_sVkXFffX01F1ovqs0e8e3m10

  21. 21Executed exec_command call_dtvdtB7KfvlgXS3vDLwCrwO1

    Executed exec_command call_dtvdtB7KfvlgXS3vDLwCrwO1

  22. 22Executed exec_command call_WHB3KIL7iUH3G1QXw60kmGoE

    Executed exec_command call_WHB3KIL7iUH3G1QXw60kmGoE

  23. 23The code diff is narrow: five changed instructions/operands, but only one introduces a new secret-copy path. I’m decodin…

    The code diff is narrow: five changed instructions/operands, but only one introduces a new secret-copy path. I’m decoding the v1 branch targets directly so the report rests on the binaries, not the vendor map.

  24. 24Executed exec_command call_6Vm3es6KNHCFg1HfBFb2XM0l

    Executed exec_command call_6Vm3es6KNHCFg1HfBFb2XM0l

  25. 25Executed exec_command call_Cj869jtAIL5ki8r0sCtsajNR

    Executed exec_command call_Cj869jtAIL5ki8r0sCtsajNR

  26. 26Executed exec_command call_nWvOJTrAWyZZJznZrTWM1aTS

    Executed exec_command call_nWvOJTrAWyZZJznZrTWM1aTS

  27. 27I’ve confirmed the only control-flow patch that unlocks new behavior is the branch at 0x70 in cert_validate; the hash_up…

    I’ve confirmed the only control-flow patch that unlocks new behavior is the branch at 0x70 in cert_validate; the hash_update change is structurally similar but consistent with a documented policy path. I’m extracting the exact ASCII value that flows out of the legacy path now.

  28. 28Executed exec_command call_qnLCYySXZzfnqwOkzPLiJTlz

    Executed exec_command call_qnLCYySXZzfnqwOkzPLiJTlz

  29. 29Executed exec_command call_5B0NdlRp1D7KzRTlOyXucAHZ

    Executed exec_command call_5B0NdlRp1D7KzRTlOyXucAHZ

  30. 30Executed exec_command call_bTc0Ljj2tQqaIrc1IwrhbDjp

    Executed exec_command call_bTc0Ljj2tQqaIrc1IwrhbDjp

  31. 31Executed exec_command call_019RbjNNgbnGbHMXRNEQAEgC

    Executed exec_command call_019RbjNNgbnGbHMXRNEQAEgC

  32. 32Executed exec_command call_WCbT9mTj4EccRAHDl6hrLcgj

    Executed exec_command call_WCbT9mTj4EccRAHDl6hrLcgj

  33. 33Executed exec_command call_SoI5AY173XnZRR4G27Z31qDd

    Executed exec_command call_SoI5AY173XnZRR4G27Z31qDd

  34. 34I have the ground-truth values from the binaries. I’m writing the four artifact files now and then I’ll do a quick read-…

    I have the ground-truth values from the binaries. I’m writing the four artifact files now and then I’ll do a quick read-back to confirm the contents.

  35. 35Executed apply_patch call_PYNWzRSvcflY7Zzt5R8drMxO

    Executed apply_patch call_PYNWzRSvcflY7Zzt5R8drMxO

  36. 36Executed exec_command call_vAt2QhcItOTnezBOagSr6YWs

    Executed exec_command call_vAt2QhcItOTnezBOagSr6YWs

  37. 37Executed exec_command call_0ZtSsxgjRgqt6DK1WR47hRfR

    Executed exec_command call_0ZtSsxgjRgqt6DK1WR47hRfR

  38. 38Executed update_plan call_46qLEO8pZ71Z3TzfYcsw6ysm

    Executed update_plan call_46qLEO8pZ71Z3TzfYcsw6ysm

  39. 39The artifacts are written under [/logs/artifacts](/logs/artifacts): cert_validate contains the malicious patch. The patc…

    The artifacts are written under /logs/artifacts:

    cert_validate contains the malicious patch. The patched instruction starts at offset 0x70 in firmware_v2.bin, accepts the legacy certificate OID 0x00badc0d, and unlocks a path that yields the payload exfiltrated_core_secret=RV32I_PATCH_BACKDOOR.

    Files:

    • /logs/artifacts/offset.txt
    • /logs/artifacts/function.txt
    • /logs/artifacts/trigger.txt
    • /logs/artifacts/payload.txt